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Lekking males are thought to face strong directional selection on secondary sexual traits. How variation in male traits can persist
under these conditions remains problematic (the lek paradox). Here, we present several game-theoretic models that show that
avoidance of costly and mobile predators, sneakers, or brood parasites (enemies) leads to variation in female choice. This can result
in maintenance of variation in male quality. ‘‘Enemies’’ will congregate around higher quality males. Females must then trade-off
the benefits of mating with high-quality males against the increased risk of enemies. At equilibrium, the models predict a positive
correlation between the quality of a male and the proportions of both enemies and females visiting him. In the first model, we use
this framework to predict the lowest quality male on the lek that will receive any matings. In the second model, we examine the
influence of this female-enemy game on the maintenance of variation in male quality. Low-quality males are likely to persist when
enemies are costly to females or occur at high density, and when there is some spatial structure on the lek, so that neighboring
males are typically of similar quality. If enemies are more costly to males than to females, high-quality males may benefit from
receiving fewer female visits. In the third model, we consider the special case when enemies are male reproductive parasites. These
models illustrate the importance of considering the simultaneous decisions of multiple players in mate choice games. Key words:
alternative reproductive tactics, genetic variation, harassment, predation risk, sexual selection. [Behav Ecol 17:97–107 (2006)]
Leks are male aggregations, usually at traditional sites, thatare visited by females primarily for the purpose of obtain-
ing fertilizations (Ho¨glund and Alatalo, 1995). On leks, the
mating decisions and mating success of both males and females
can often be readily observed. Thus, lekking has become a
model system for understanding both sexual selection and
the benefits of group living. Because the costs of choice
among lekking males should be low, leks offer particularly
good systems for addressing questions of female mate
choice. Many studies have shown female choice for certain
male traits on leks (reviewed in Andersson, 1994; Ho¨glund
and Alatalo, 1995). However, this observation is somewhat
paradoxical because variation in these traits should diminish
rapidly due to the directional selection imposed by female
choice. Nevertheless, female choice persists and so does var-
iation in the male secondary sexual traits chosen by females.
The maintenance of variation in the face of strong direc-
tional selection on a trait is a general problem in evolution-
ary biology. The combination of strong female choice with
the persistence of variation in male secondary sexual charac-
ters on leks has led to this phenomenon being labeled the
‘‘lek paradox’’ (Borgia, 1979; Taylor and Williams, 1982).
Here, we focus on the lek paradox in the most narrow sense,
which is the maintenance of variation in female choice and
male quality on leks and similar male aggregations (e.g., aggre-
gated nest sites of many fishes with exclusive paternal care—-
ocellated wrasse: Taborsky et al., 1987; blennies: Oliveira et al.,
2002; Goncxalves et al., 2003; sunfish: Gross, 1984). Several
different solutions to this paradox have been suggested.
Variation in male traits could be maintained despite strong
directional selection and the absence of direct benefits to
female choice through nonlinear selection for exaggerated
traits (Pomiankowski and Møller, 1995, but see Rowe and
Houle, 1996), cyclic evolution of sexually selected traits due
to intrinsically unstable Fisher’s runaway processes (Iwasa and
Pomiankowski, 1995), and condition dependence of sexually
selected traits (Rowe and Houle, 1996).
Another possibility is that reproductive skew on leks is not
as high as often thought because females also mate with low-
quality males. In other words, variation in male traits persists
because there is no strong directional selection on these. This
may be for a number of different reasons. Randerson et al.
(2000) suggested that simple errors in mate choice enable the
maintenance of variation in mate quality. Females may not be
as choosy as typically thought if, for example, there is high
predation risk on the lek (Grafe, 1997). Females may also
express age-specific preferences, which could increase varia-
tion in mate choice (Coleman et al., 2004). Further, females
may choose for compatible, rather than good, genes so that
each female has a different optimal mate (Mays and Hill,
2004; Neff and Pitcher, 2005; Roberts and Gosling, 2003).
Selection for direct benefits, which may not necessarily corre-
late with indirect benefits, could also conceivably lead to var-
iation in female choice (Kirkpatrick and Ryan, 1991; Reynolds
and Gross, 1990; Williams, 1993). Although lekking males are
typically not thought to provide direct benefits to choosing
females, the latter may benefit from reduced costs associated
with choosing particular males.
Males may differ in their risk to females in terms of pre-
dation (on females or eggs), reproductive parasitism, or ha-
rassment. If high-quality bourgeois (territorial) males attract
large numbers of predators, reproductive parasites, harassing
males, or pathogens (hereafter collectively referred to as
enemies), then females must trade-off the genetic benefits
of mating with high-quality bourgeois males against the costs
imposed by enemies. High-quality males may be riskier be-
cause they are more conspicuous (Breden and Stoner, 1987)
or because they harbor higher densities of sexually transmit-
ted pathogens or ectoparasites (Kokko et al., 2002; Reynolds
and Gross, 1990). Here, we suggest that high-quality males
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may also be risky to females because mobile enemies will tend
to congregate around them, even if they are no more conspic-
uous than lower quality males. Although this may not be a uni-
versal phenomenon, it may explain variable female choice in
many systems and offers one resolution of the lek paradox.
This argument assumes that mobile enemies can impose
high costs on females. Clearly, predators on females or eggs
will be costly. Brood parasites should also be costly to females
if parasites kill or harm host offspring or if the costs of paren-
tal care increase with brood size (e.g., in fish: Sato, 1986;
Wisenden, 1999; in birds: Tewksbury et al., 2002; in insects:
Tallamy and Horton, 1990). Harassing males may impose en-
ergetic costs, disrupt matings, or injure females (e.g., Bro-
Jørgensen, 2003; Magurran and Seghers, 1994; Schlupp et al.,
2001; Shine et al., 2000; Stone, 1995; reviewed in Clutton-
Brock and Parker, 1995). Finally, there is evidence that fe-
males avoid sneakers (Alonzo and Warner, 1999, 2000; van
den Berghe et al., 1989; Warner and Hoffman, 1980; reviewed
in Taborsky, 1994), suggesting that the latter are costly to
females. Such costs may result from low genetic quality of
sneakers (van den Berge et al., 1989), costs of harassment
(for references, see above), nest predation (van den Berghe
et al., 1989), or negative brood care responses of bourgeois
males (Neff, 2003).
The argument that females attempt to avoid parasitic or
harassing males when making decisions regarding mating on
leks has been proposed previously (e.g., Alonzo and Warner,
2000; Clutton-Brock et al., 1992; Taborsky, 1994). However, this
hypothesis has been rejected in several instances based on the
observation that females tended to congregate around males
that bear high risks of harassment or parasitism or because
there was no correlation between harassment and mating
(Carbone and Taborsky, 1995; Saether et al., 1999). Similarly,
evidence for the influence of harassment on mate choice is
equivocal. Some studies show a clear influence of harassment
avoidance on mate choice (Carranza and Valencia, 1999; Fox,
2002; Hunter and Jones, 1999 and references therein),
whereas others have found higher harassment rates on leks
than off leks, and yet females strongly preferred males on
the lek (Bro-Jørgensen, 2002, 2003; Saether et al., 1999). How-
ever, as also emphasized in several recent studies (e.g., Alonzo
and Warner, 1999, 2000; Goncxalves et al., 2003; Oliveira et al.,
2002), we argue that the decisions of mobile enemies, which
would also be expected to congregate around males that are
preferred by females (Arak, 1982), have largely been ignored.
Here, we extend this logic to examine the consequences of
decisions by females and mobile enemies on the maintenance
of variation in male quality and male reproductive tactics.
We first present a simple model in which bourgeois males
are ranked according to quality. We use this model to predict
the number of males that receive female visits, one measure of
the functional size of the lek, and the number of female visits
received by each male, a measure of reproductive skew. In a
second model, we examine the consequences of female-enemy
interactions on the success of bourgeois males. We examine
when low-quality males are able to persist on a lek and when
males might even benefit from receiving fewer female visits. In
a third model, we examine the consequences of the female-
enemy game when enemies are male reproductive parasites.
In all models, all females have the same preference function
in the absence of enemies, that is, they all prefer the highest
quality males. Because the distribution of enemies will follow
that of females, this leads to some females preferring the
‘‘good’’ males as expected and some visiting the low-quality
males because they present a smaller risk. We show that this
can promote the existence of ‘‘poor’’ males, despite a uni-
modal distribution of female mating preference for indirect
(genetic) benefits in the population.
THE MODELS
The model is based on predator-prey habitat selection games
(e.g., Hugie and Dill, 1994; Sih, 1998). The model assumes
that all females rank males in the same way. We do not explic-
itly model the evolution of traits used by females in ranking
but assume that ranking is based on some trait that is an in-
dex, or otherwise an honest signal of relative quality, where
quality is some measure of ‘‘good genes’’ (sensu Andersson,
1994). In the absence of enemies, females that mate with
high-quality males produce offspring with greater viability
than females that mate with low-quality males. Variation in
male quality and female preferences are assumed to be heri-
table. In the first model, females could also benefit from
choosing high-quality males because their sons will also be
attractive. In the second and third models, however, we solve
for equilibrium conditions in which the fitnesses of high- and
low-quality males and of females that choose each are equal.
At equilibrium, the benefits of producing more attractive sons
are exactly balanced by the costs of enemies also attracted to
these sons. Nevertheless, runaway selection resulting from co-
variance between female preference and male characters may
still have an influence on the rate at which the equilibrium is
approached and on the evolution of characters used by fe-
males to assess quality.
In general, we model a game between females and enemies,
which may be any of the predators on females, predators on
both males and females, egg predators (when fertilization is
external), brood parasites, or males pursuing parasitic or co-
ercive alternative reproductive tactics. We then examine the
consequences of this game for female and enemy behavior
and bourgeois male mating success. Although we include
the dynamics of bourgeois males in the model, it is not for-
mally a three-player game because the frequencies of good
and poor males have no influence on the decisions of females
and enemies (except in the trivial case when there are no
poor males).
We first derive a model that predicts the lowest quality male
above which bourgeois males can expect to receive visits from
females and enemies. Then, we use a simplified version of this
model to predict how interactions between females and ene-
mies influence the frequency of high- and low-quality bour-
geois males. In these first two models, enemies are assumed to
be members of a different species (or different class, e.g.,
juveniles) than the bourgeois males and females. Finally, we
develop an extension of the second model that is specific for
male reproductive parasites, in which we also solve for the
equilibrium proportions of bourgeois and parasitic males.
This results in two major changes to the model. First, sneakers
may impose no costs on females. Second, sneakers must exist
in equilibrium with bourgeois males, so that there are four
possible types of males (good bourgeois male, poor bourgeois
male, sneaker that parasitizes good bourgeois males, and
sneaker that parasitizes poor bourgeois males).
As described above, bourgeois males vary in quality (qi),
where i is the ranking of each male in terms of quality (i ¼
1 to imax), with i ¼ 1 representing the highest quality male (or
males, in the case of the final two models). In the first model,
the number of males on the lek is equal to imax.
Females choose to mate only with bourgeois males of a given
quality; the proportion choosing each male type, i, is fi. The
density of females visiting the lek (or the visitation rate) is nf.
Note that females are not time or sperm limited and can
therefore always find their chosen male.
We assume that future reproductive success is equal for all
females. Furthermore, at equilibrium, the fitness of an aver-
age male and an average female offspring must be the same.
If variation in male types and female choice are to persist as
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mixed evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs), the average fit-
ness of good and poor males and of females that choose each
must also be equal. Therefore, the relative fitness of a female
visiting male i, in the absence of enemies, is simply qi, the
number of viable offspring of either sex that she can expect
to produce from mating with that male. Enemies reduce this
value in a negative exponential fashion as follows:
Wfi ¼ qieypinp : ð1Þ
The parameter y describes the costliness of each enemy, pi is
the proportion of enemies that choose male i, and np is the
total density of enemies. The cost of enemies is in terms of
reduced clutch size, either directly (e.g., predation on eggs or
on the female) or indirectly (e.g., increased energetic expen-
ditures result in a higher probability of clutch failure), result-
ing from interactions with enemies.
In this model, enemies wait at a particular male for females
to arrive. They then compete by scramble competition for
access to v resources provided by females. The payoff to an
enemy that chooses male i is
Wpi ¼
vfinf
pinp
ð2Þ
From Equation 2, the fitnesses of enemies visiting a male of
type i versus type i 1 1 are equal when pi=pi11 ¼ fi=fi11; as in
the basic continuous input ideal-free distribution (Fretwell
and Lucas, 1970). Replacing pi with fi in Equation 1, we can
solve for the lowest quality male, i* that will receive any female
visits (i.e., for which fi . 0). The last rank to receive any
female visits is the largest integer with a value less than icrit,
where icrit satisfies the following equality:
ynp ¼ 
Xicrit
i¼1
ln
qicrit
qi
 
ð3Þ
Thus, i* gives one measure of functional lek size, the number
of males at the lek site that mate. From this, it is apparent that
functional lek size increases with increasing costliness (y) and
density (np) of enemies.
The proportion of mates gained by each rank is
f ðiÞ ¼ 1
i*

ln qi*qi
 
ynp
1
Pi*
i¼1 ln
qi*
qi
 
i*ynp
: ð4Þ
To find analytical solutions for these conditions, let us as-
sume that, on the lek in question, relative male quality and
rank are related according to the following negative exponen-
tial function:
qðiÞ ¼ ekði1Þ: ð5Þ
This function describes a population with few males of very
high quality and many males of poorer quality, as might be ex-
pected if, for example, poor-quality males cluster around a
small number of attractive males (Beehler and Foster, 1988).
It yields positive values for male quality even for very low-
ranked males. Using a linear function instead of Equation 5
does not change the qualitative results of the model, although
quantitative predictions change, and maximum lek size be-
comes constrained by the condition that male quality must
be 0.
In Equation 5, the quality of the top-ranked male is stan-
dardized to 1, and the difference in quality between adjoining
ranks increases with increasing k. Substituting Equation 5 into
Equation 3 and solving for icrit, we find that the value of i* is
the largest integer with a value less than
icrit ¼
k1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
k21 8kynp
q
2k
: ð6Þ
If there are at least i* males on the lek, the proportion of
females visiting each male from i ¼ 1 to i* is found by
substituting Equations 5 and 6 into Equation 4:
f ðiÞ ¼ 1
i*
1
kð1  2i1 i*Þ
2ynp
: ð7Þ
From Equations 6 and 7, predicted functional lek size in-
creases, and the proportion of females visiting the highest
ranked individual decreases as the costliness and density of
enemies increase (increasing y and np; Figure 1) and the dif-
ference in quality between adjacent ranks (k) decreases.
Female decisions and the maintenance of variation
in male quality
In this model, we assume that there are only two classes of
males: high- and low-quality males (good and poor males). We
assume infinite (or very large) populations of males, females,
and enemies. This does not necessarily mean that leks are very
large as the population may be subdivided into many leks.
Therefore, rather than using densities of males, females,
and enemies, we model the number of these per lek. We
assume that any vacancies on leks are immediately replaced,
so that the numbers of male and female types on the lek do
not change with predation. The proportion of bourgeois
males of each type i is denoted mi, and the total number of
males on the lek is nm. We assume that males are unrelated,
only gain matings on leks, all leks are identical, choice is not
based on a condition-dependent trait, and males do not
change in quality over their lifetime; thus, if good and poor
males are to persist in the population, they must have equal
fitnesses at equilibrium. Violation of some or all of these as-
sumptions is likely in many real systems, which may facilitate
the maintenance of variation in natural populations; however,
we sought to explore whether avoidance of enemies alone
could explain persistence in variation in male traits and set
Figure 1
The proportion of female visits received according to male rank (i),
when male quality q(i) and rank are related according to the func-
tion q(i) ¼ ek(i1). Results are shown for increasing costliness of
enemies to females, y. As costliness to females increases, a larger
number of males receive visits, while high-quality males receive fewer
visits. Enemies follow the same distribution as females. k ¼ 0.24,
np ¼ 10.
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up stringent conditions under which the persistence of such
variation was unlikely.
There may be several males of each quality present on the
lek, and females and enemies that prefer males of a particular
type may have several males from which to choose. In the case
of females, we assumed that females are divided evenly among
the nmmi males. In the case of enemies, we considered that
they might be able to exploit more than one male. However, it
is unlikely that, if enemies can exploit several males, they
would restrict themselves to only one type if males of the other
type were available.
To address exploitation of multiple males, we assume that
there is some spatial structure on the lek, so that good and
poor males are not distributed randomly. As will be shown
later, this assumption is necessary for poor males to persist
when more than one male may be exploited. We use the
following asymptotic function to model the proportion of
the total number of males of each type (or enemies or females
visiting those males) around a given male.
kjiðAÞ ¼ A
gji 1A
; A ¼ pr 2: ð8Þ
As search radius increases, the value of kji(A) approaches 1.
The value gji is a measure of clustering. When gji is small, most
males of type j are near males of type i. Specifically, when g12.
g11 and g21 . g22, males tend to be clustered with others of the
same type as themselves. In spatially explicit simulations (not
shown), the values of g12 and g21 tended to be similar, so we
simplify our models by assuming that these are the same. The
value, g12, can also be thought of as a measure of spatial sep-
aration between male types. For example, very high levels of
g12 are equivalent to having several leks in close proximity,
linked by the same pool of choosing females (e.g., ruffs,
Ho¨glund et al., 1998).
In order for females to be able to choose among males
differing in risk, enemies must not be able to efficiently search
and exploit the entire lek. Otherwise, barring differences in
intrinsic risk (e.g., some males may be in intrinsically safer
locations), risk of enemies would be equal among males, and
females should not consider risk in their decisions. Therefore,
we assume that enemies can only search a limited area, defined
as pr2, where r is the search radius and which may encompass
several bourgeois males. Enemies can exploit any female that
visits a bourgeois male within their search area. Thus, the
search area defines a neighborhood of interactions with ene-
mies for a given male and for females visiting that male.
Because enemies have a limited search area and because we
assume that there is usually a spatial structure to the lek,
enemies must choose where to focus their searching efforts
(i.e., enemies of good males exploit regions where good males
are frequent) when they first arrive on the lek. If there is no
spatial structure to the lek, all enemies choose a random lo-
cation (i.e, there is no difference between choosing poor or
good male areas). The number of enemies in the neighbor-
hood of a bourgeois male of type i is
Ei ¼
X
j
nppj kjiðAÞ ð9Þ
A similar approach could be used in the earlier model.
However, this would involve making specific assumptions re-
garding the position of each member of the lek with respect to
the others. Allowing enemies to focus on only one male could
be considered to be an extreme form of the spatial structure
discussed above, in that an enemy on a male of type i cannot
exploit males of other types.
Enemies reduce the fitnesses of both females and males, as
in Equation 1, but may affect each sex differently. For exam-
ple, females may be less affected by sneakers than are bour-
geois males, while females may be more at risk from some
types of predators (e.g., if females and males differ in size).
The parameters x and y denote the effects of increasing local
density of enemies on bourgeois male and female fitnesses,
respectively.
If a female mates with a male of type i, her fitness is
Wfið f ;m; pÞ ¼ qie
yEi if mi . 0
0 if mi ¼ 0 :

ð10Þ
The fitness of a male of type i is
Wmið f ;m; pÞ ¼
finf
minm
qie
xEi : ð11Þ
Enemies gain resources of value, v, from each female, the
value of which has no influence on the model predictions. We
assume that enemies compete with one another for access to
females. Again, assuming an even or random distribution of
females among bourgeois males of a given type, the fitness of
an enemy exploiting males of type i is
Wpið f ;m; pÞ ¼
v
P
j nf fj kjiðAÞ
Ei
: ð12Þ
For simplicity, we divide the populations of males, females,
and enemies into two types: ‘‘high quality’’ and ‘‘low quality’’
(i ¼ 1 and i ¼ 2, respectively; m2 ¼ 1  m1). Low-quality
females and enemies refer to those that choose males of low
quality. We search for the equilibrium where
Wf 1 ¼ Wf 2; ð13aÞ
Wp1 ¼ Wp2; ð13bÞ
Wm1 ¼ Wm2: ð13cÞ
Some females and enemies should choose to associate with
low-quality bourgeois males, and low-quality bourgeois males
should persist (i.e., the equilibrium is m*2 . 0; f
*
2 . 0;
p*2 . 0), when
q2
q1
. e
ynpAðg11g12Þ
ðg111AÞðg121AÞ: ð14Þ
A homogenous male population is only expected when ene-
mies are not costly to females or are relatively rare, when all
poor males are of very low quality, or when there is no spatial
structure on the lek. Spatial clumping has a strong effect on
the model. As can be seen from Inequality 14, if there is no
spatial heterogeneity of male types (i.e., g12 ¼ g11), good males
will always do better than poor males and poor males will go
extinct. Specifically, good males must be more likely to have
good males as neighbors than do poor males.
When q2/q1 is greater than the right-hand side of Inequality
14 and less than 1, there is an equilibrium described by the
following:
p*2 ¼
ðg221AÞ ynpAðg11  g12Þ1 ln q1q2
 
ðg111AÞðg121AÞ
h i
ynpA½2g11g22  g12ðg111 g22Þ1Aðg111 g22  2g12Þ :
ð15aÞ
f *2 ¼ p*2 ð15bÞ
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m*2 ¼
q2f
*
2 e
xE2
q1ð1  f *2 ÞexE1 1 q2f *2 exE2
: ð15cÞ
These equilibrium frequencies of enemies, females, and males
(p*2 ; f
*
2 ; and m
*
2 ) are evolutionarily stable under replicator
dynamics (Figure 2). On Figure 2, we show the best response
curves for females and enemies (i.e., for a given frequency of
females visiting low-quality males, the best response curve for
enemies is the frequency of enemies visiting poor males,
which yields the highest fitness). The intersection of these
curves represents the equilibrium frequencies of enemies
and females visiting poor males and, as shown in Figure 2,
any perturbation from this equilibrium will return to it. There
are also unstable equilibria at f2 ¼ p2 ¼ 0 and f2 ¼ p2 ¼ 1. A
population perturbed from these equilibria will move away
from them.
The frequency of female visits to poor males increases with
increasing cost of enemies on females (Equation 15b; Figure
3a). The distribution of enemies exactly matches that of
females (Equation 15b). The proportion of females visiting
poor males increases with increasing clustering of good males
(decreasing g11) and decreases with increasing clustering of
poor males (decreasing g22). The effect of the spatial separa-
tion between male types on visitation of poor males interacts
with search radius of enemies. If good and poor males are
equally clustered, or if poor males are more clustered than
good males, the proportion of females visiting poor males
increases with increasing separation between poor and good
males (Figure 4a). On the other hand, if good males are more
clustered, visitation of poor males increases with increasing
separation between poor and good males when search radii
are large but decreases when search radii are small (Figure
4b). In general, the proportion of females and enemies visit-
ing poor males increases with search radius at small radii but
decreases as the search radius begins to encompass a large
proportion of males on the lek (thereby reducing the effects
of spatial structure) (Figure 4).
When the effects of enemies on female fitness and the per-
female increment in male fitness are similar, or when enemies
have little effect on male fitness, the frequency of poor males
closely matches the frequency of females that will visit them.
If, on the other hand, males are much more strongly affected
by enemies than are females (i.e., x is high and y is low), the
frequency of poor males will be much higher than the fre-
quency of females that will visit them (Figure 3b). Indeed,
well more than 50% of the male population may be composed
of poor males (Figure 3b). This is because females and ene-
mies will tend to congregate at high-quality males if females
experience few costs from high enemy densities. This can lead
to drastic reductions in the fitness of good males. Indeed, the
effects of enemies on the fitness of good males can be so
severe that good males would do better if fewer females visited
Figure 2
Best response curves for females (dashed gray line) and enemies
(solid gray line). Along these lines, the fitness payoffs for
choosing good or poor bourgeois males are equal. If perturbed from
these lines, the population frequencies change as indicated by
arrows. There are three equilibria: a stable equilibrium at the
intersection of these lines and unstable equilibria at choosing only
good males and choosing only poor males. The stable equilibrium is
an attractor under replicator dynamics, as shown for an example
population evolving toward this equilibrium from initial frequencies
of 99% of enemies and females choosing poor males (black line;
direction of population trajectory indicated by arrows along line).
Thus, this equilibrium qualifies as an ESS.
Figure 3
Evolutionarily stable proportions of females and enemies (a)
choosing poor bourgeois males (or, in the case of enemies, regions
of high densities of poor bourgeois males). As the results are exactly
the same for females and enemies, only one result is shown. In panel
(b), we show the proportion of bourgeois males that are of low
quality at equilibrium. All results are plotted against increasing cost
of enemies to females (y) and males (x). Costliness to males has no
effect on the decisions of females or enemies, but high costliness to
males leads to a high proportion of poor males in the population.
Note that values of female cost coefficient increase from right to left.
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them, because they would then experience lower rates of
visitation by enemies. This would be the case when
x .
yðg121AÞ½Aðg111 g22  2g12Þ  g12ðg111 g22Þ1 2g11g22
ðg11  g12Þ ln q1q2
 
ðg121AÞðg221AÞ  ynpAðg22  g12Þ
h i :
ð16Þ
The relative costs of enemies on males and females also
influence reproductive skew, as measured by the per capita
mating frequency or female visitation rate of good and poor
males (not their relative fitnesses, as these must be equal).
The relative success of a good male to a poor male is
q ¼ q2
q1
 1xy
: ð17Þ
Skew increases as the relative cost to males versus that to
females increases. Skew also increases as the quality of poor
males decreases.
A model with parasitic males
Enemies may be reproductive parasites of males, such as
sneakers or satellites. For these parasitic males to influence
female mating decisions, they must persist in equilibrium with
the good and poor bourgeois males. Furthermore, such males
may impose no costs on females (or even benefit females if
they are of high quality). Here, we derive a model specific to
male reproductive parasites. We consider parasitic and bour-
geois tactics to represent a genetic polymorphism, with equal
fitness at equilibrium (e.g., ruffs, Lank et al., 1995, and possi-
bly Lamprologus callipterus (Teleostei, Cichlidae), Taborsky,
2001). We recognize that in many other cases, alternative re-
productive tactics represent a conditional strategy (Gross,
1996), but we do not consider state- and status-dependent
decisions further in this model.
The neighborhood number of parasitic males is the same
as in Equation 9. However, np and nm are replaced by snm and
(1  s)nm, respectively, where s is the proportion of males that
pursue sneaking. Bourgeois and parasitic males compete for
fertilizations. We model scramble competition but do not
specify whether this is sperm competition or premating com-
petition (where F would represent the average success of
each tactic over many female visits). Each female produces
b eggs. The fertilization success per female of each tactic is
influenced by their relative competitive ability (Cp and Cm for
parasitic and bourgeois males, respectively). Here, we con-
sider that all bourgeois males (high and low quality, which,
to reiterate, are measures of the number of viable offspring
males can sire) have similar competitive abilities. The fertil-
ization success of bourgeois males (of high and low quality)
and parasitic males (visiting bourgeois males of high and low
quality) are as follows:
Fmi ¼ bCm
Cm 1CpEi
: ð18aÞ
Fpi ¼
bCp
Cm 1CpEi
: ð18bÞ
The total fertilization success of a bourgeois male is then
simply
Wmi ¼
finp
ð1  sÞminmqiFmi : ð19Þ
The total fertilization success of a parasitic male of quality
qs is
Wpið f ;m; pÞ ¼ Aqs
X
j
gij fjnf Fpi : ð20Þ
The total fitness of a female is
Wfið f ;m; p; sÞ ¼ b qiCm
Cm 1CpEi
1
qsCpEi
Cm 1CpEi
 
: ð21Þ
Standardizing the competitive ability of parasitic males (Cp)
to 1 and the quality of good bourgeois males (q1) to 1, we first
solve for when poor bourgeois males will persist. Poor bour-
geois males will persist in the population when parasitic males
are present and
Figure 4
Influence of the spatial structure of the lek and the searching
behavior of enemies on the evolutionarily stable proportions of
females and enemies choosing poor bourgeois males (or, in the case
of enemies, regions of high densities of poor bourgeois males). The
results are exactly the same for females and enemies, so only one
result is shown. In (a), the good and poor males are equally
clustered (i.e., g11 ¼ g22). In (b), good males are more tightly
clustered than poor males (i.e., g11 , g22). All results are plotted
against increasing distance between males of different types (g12)
and search radius of enemies (r). Note that values of search radius of
enemies increase from right to left.
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q2 .
q1ðg111AÞ  qsðg11  g12Þ
g121A
: ð22Þ
Parasitic males will persist in the system, if poor bourgeois
males are also present, when
Cm ,
qsAnmðq2  qsÞ½f *2 ðg11  g12Þ1 g121A
ðg221AÞðg121AÞ½f *2 qsðq1  q2Þ1 q1ðq2  qsÞ
; ð23Þ
where f *2 is the equilibrium proportion of females choosing
poor bourgeois males (see below, Equation 25). Note that the
quality of poor bourgeois males influences whether parasitic
males can invade the system. When there is a large difference
in quality among bourgeois males, parasitic males are more
likely to persist.
If poor bourgeois males are not present, parasitic males can
still persist in the system when
Cm ,
qsAnm
q1ðg111AÞ: ð24Þ
If qs, q1, qs, q2 and Inequalities 22 and 23 are satisfied, there
is a stable equilibrium, with some mixture of good and poor
bourgeois males and parasitic males, and unstable equilibria
at m2 ¼ 0 and m2 ¼ 1. If qs . q1 and qs . q2, the equilibrium
mixture of good and poor bourgeois males is unstable, and
there are stable equilibria at m2 ¼ 0 and m2 ¼ 1. Finally, if qs .
q2 but qs , q1, Inequality 22 cannot be satisfied, and the only
(stable) equilibrium is m2 ¼ 0. We verified the stability of these
equilibria using replicator dynamic simulations (results not
presented).
To simplify the presentation of results, we assume that g11 ¼
g22 ¼ G subsequently. In other words, clustering is the same
for good and poor males (although good and poor males are
spatially separated). The equilibrium proportion of females
choosing poor bourgeois males is
f *2 ¼
Að1  q2Þ1Gð1  qsÞ  g12ðq2  qsÞ
ðG  g12Þðq2  qsÞ : ð25Þ
As in the general model, more females visit poor bourgeois
males when the cost to females of parasitic males is high (i.e.,
the quality of parasitic males, qs, is low) and when spatial
clustering is high.
The equilibrium proportion of all males that pursue the
parasitic tactic is
s* ¼ 1  CmðG 1AÞðg121AÞ½qsf
*
2 ð1  q2Þ1 q2  qs 
qsnmAðq2  qsÞ½f *2 ðG  g12Þ1 ðg121AÞ
: ð26Þ
The proportion of parasitic males increases with increasing
competitive ability of parasitic males (lower Cm), higher qual-
ity of these males, decreased spatial separation of poor and
good males (lower g12), and a larger search radius (Figure 5).
Of the s* parasitic males, the equilibrium proportion that
will visit poor bourgeois males is
p*2 ¼
fCmð1  q2ÞðG 1AÞðg121AÞ1 s*Anm ½Að1  q2Þ
1Gð1  qsÞ  g12ðq2  qsÞgðG 1AÞ

=

s*AnmðG  g12Þð11 q2  2qsÞ

: ð27Þ
The equilibrium proportion of parasitic males visiting poor
males is always less than that of females doing the same. As the
competitive ability of both types of bourgeois males increases,
fewer parasitic males visit low-quality bourgeois males. As the
competitive ability of bourgeois males increases, the fre-
quency of parasitic males decreases, so that parasitic males
experience less competition from other parasitic males. As
the search radius and degree of spatial clustering increase,
more parasitic males visit poor bourgeois males.
The equilibrium proportion of bourgeois males that are
poor is
m*2 ¼
f *2 q2ðq1  qsÞ
f *2 qsðq1  q2Þ1 q1ðq2  qsÞ
: ð28Þ
In the previous model, the influence of the costliness of
parasitic males to females on the frequency of poor males
depended on the cost of parasitic males to bourgeois males.
In contrast, in this model, the equilibrium proportion of
poor males always increases as the costliness of parasitic
males to females increases (qs decreases). Interestingly, the
relative competitive ability of bourgeois males (which is
a measure of the cost of parasitic males to bourgeois males
and is the same for both good and poor bourgeois males)
has no influence on the equilibrium frequency of poor bour-
geois males. Poor bourgeois males become more frequent as
their quality, relative to that of good males, increases. How-
ever, this is only true when parasitic males are present. From
Equation 26, the frequency of parasitic males in the popula-
tion (s*) decreases as the difference in quality between bour-
geois males decreases. When differences between bourgeois
males are small, there may be no parasitic males at equilib-
rium. Consequently, poor bourgeois males cannot persist.
The only other factor that influences the frequency of poor
males is the degree of spatial clustering on the lek. As be-
fore, when male types are highly clustered, poor males are
more frequent, and in the absence of clustering, poor bour-
geois males cannot persist.
Unlike in the previous model, bourgeois males could never
do better by receiving fewer female visits. This is despite the
cost of parasitic males weighing more heavily on bourgeois
males than females. The cost to bourgeois males is purely in
Figure 5
Evolutionarily stable proportion of males that pursue parasitic
reproductive tactics plotted against the quality of poor bourgeois
males (q2) and the degree of spatial clustering of bourgeois male
types (G). Values for q2 range from those approaching the quality of
parasitic males (qs ¼ 0.6) to that of good bourgeois males (q1 ¼ 1).
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terms of scramble competition in this model. However, if we
modify the present model to include additional costs (by re-
ducing the payoff by exEi ), we find a result similar to that in
the previous model: good males could do better if they re-
ceived fewer females when x is very high (unpublished mod-
eling results).
As in the previous model, the relative success of good bour-
geois males is influenced by the relative costliness of parasitic
males. The ratio of female visits to each good male to that to
each poor male is as follows:
q ¼ q2ðq1  qsÞ
q1ðq2  qsÞ: ð29Þ
DISCUSSION
Our models demonstrate that the pressure of enemies, includ-
ing predators of breeding males and females, egg predators,
or parasitic males or females, can lead to a stable mixed dis-
tribution of female mate choices, so that some females choose
to mate with low-quality males (or, alternatively, all females
choose to mate with low-quality males sometimes) despite uni-
form assessment of genetic quality by females. We found that
low-quality males can persist in such a system, sometimes at
very high frequencies. However, some degree of spatial clus-
tering is necessary for poor males to persist. Thus, our model
provides one solution to the so-called lek paradox, in which
uniform female preferences should lead to the rapid elimina-
tion of variation in male quality in the population (Borgia,
1979; Taylor and Williams, 1982). In our model, the intrinsic
ranking of males in the absence of enemies is uniform, and
uniform choice and the elimination of poor males will occur
whenever Inequality 14 or 22 is not satisfied. However, when
the cost of enemies to females is high, poor males persist. In
addition, in a version of the model considering male repro-
ductive parasites, the opportunity to choose between bour-
geois males differing in quality also increased the probability
that relatively low-quality parasitic males persisted in the pop-
ulation. Thus, female-enemy games can have a strong influ-
ence on the maintenance of low-quality males, be they
bourgeois or parasitic males.
The importance of predation and harassment risk has been
widely considered in the evolution of mating systems. How-
ever, previous considerations of the role of predation risk (or
risk of harassment) in lekking systems have focused on its
effects on female choosiness or choice for conspicuous sig-
nals, the duration of males’ attendance on leks, and on the
benefits males and females may gain from dilution of preda-
tion or harassment (Boyko et al., 2004; Carbone and Taborsky,
1995; Ho¨glund and Alatalo, 1995; Saether et al., 1999). Pre-
dation risk has also been discussed with regard to the evolu-
tion of leks (reviewed in Ho¨glund and Alatalo, 1995). All
individuals potentially may gain from dilution or vigilance
effects of staying in a group. This may often be the case for
animals foraging in groups (Krause and Ruxton, 2002); how-
ever, empirical support for predation risk as a driving force in
lek evolution is ambiguous (Bro-Jørgensen, 2002; Gibson
et al., 2002; Ho¨glund and Alatalo, 1995). Predation risk may
also influence mate choice, by increasing search costs for fe-
males, and lead to reduced choosiness by females (Jennions
and Petrie, 1997). Our models differ from the aforemen-
tioned explorations of the role of predation or other risks
in lekking because females that mate with low-quality males
do so because there is a direct, immediate cost in terms of
increased harassment or predation to mating with higher
quality males, not because of increased costs of choosiness.
We found that some sort of spatial structure within the lek
or constraint on the ability to exploit more than one male is
necessary for poor males to persist. That is, the area encom-
passed by the search radius of an enemy must contain either
only one male or a higher density of good or of poor males
than expected under a random distribution. In particular,
clustering of good males results in a larger proportion of
females and enemies choosing poor males. This is intuitive
as clustering of good males results in high densities of ene-
mies in such clusters. Keeping the distribution of good males
constant, clustering of poor males reduces the proportion of
females and enemies choosing poor males. This is likely
because, when poor males are dispersed, the number of
neighbors of poor males is overall low, so the pressure of
enemies is reduced.
When the search radius of enemies is small, an increasing
proportion of females and enemies choose poor males as
search radius increases. However, as search radius increases,
the effects of spatial heterogeneity decrease (because a large
proportion of all males on the lek can be searched by any
enemy), so that the proportion of females and enemies visit-
ing poor males declines and may be zero when the search
radius of enemies is very large.
Spatial structure appears to be common on leks (Fiske
et al., 1998). For example, high-quality males often are con-
centrated in more central parts of the lek (Fiske et al., 1998;
Kokko et al., 1998). This spatial clustering has been presumed
to result from settlement decisions and monopolization by
good and poor males (Ho¨glund and Alatalo, 1995); our mod-
els suggest that lower quality males deciding where to settle
may have to trade-off benefits of settling near good males
(Beehler and Foster, 1988; Ho¨glund and Robertson, 1990)
with vulnerability to enemies that are also attracted to these
‘‘hotshots.’’ Avoidance of high-quality males may ultimately
yield higher fitness for low-quality males if females and ene-
mies are free to move among males and enemies are very
costly to males, as shown in Figure 3.
The relative costliness of enemies to males and females
strongly influences reproductive skew and the abundance of
good and poor males. Predation risk may differ between males
and females if there is sexual size dimorphism. Costs of brood
parasites will be higher for the sex that invests more in brood
care. Egg predators may also be more costly to females if the
remating rate of females is lower than that of males. Sneakers
and other competitors for matings should be more costly to
males than to females, who still gain parentage. When the
costs of enemies on males are much higher than those on
females (but enemies are still sufficiently costly to females so
that either Inequality 14 or 22 is satisfied), then poor males
should be particularly common, at least in our second model.
This is because most females choose high-quality males, lead-
ing to high densities of enemies around these males. This
suggests an interesting extension to the model. If the cost of
enemies to males is particularly high, compared with that to
females, it may benefit males, particularly high-quality ones,
to occasionally not mate with or even chase away receptive
females, if, by doing so, they can reduce the frequency of
enemies nearby (Inequality 16, also suggested by Alonzo
and Warner, 1999). Males commonly chase away receptive
females (Alonzo and Warner, 1999; Goncxalves et al., 2003;
Oliveira et al., 2002; Saether et al., 1999), even in systems
where males are not expected to be choosy. There is evidence
for male mate choice in a lekking cichlid (Werner and Lotem,
2003). The authors also hypothesize that courtship behavior
may be costly due to, for example, increased predation risk.
Hence, more female visits would be dangerous as outlined in
our models. As our models are currently formulated, refusing
females could not be evolutionarily stable because males that
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did so would pay the cost of engaging in fewer fertilizations
while reducing the number of enemies attacking all males of
the same quality. However, if enemies have information on the
quality and probability of female visitation for each male,
these males probably could benefit from refusing female visits.
Differences in costs to bourgeois males and females should
be particularly high when enemies are male reproductive par-
asites, although our third model suggests that the cost to
bourgeois males is never high enough that they would gain
from refusing female visits. Reproductive parasites should be
more costly to bourgeois males because these lose fertiliza-
tions, while females still gain offspring. Indeed, parasitic
males may not necessarily impose any quality cost on females
or even be of higher quality (e.g., coho salmon: Gross, 1991,
1996; side-blotched lizard: Zamudio and Sinervo, 2000). Not
surprisingly, however, we find that parasitic males must be
costly if female-enemy games are to lead to the maintenance
of low-quality bourgeois males. Whether costly parasitic males
can themselves persist in the population is influenced by the
difference in quality between high- and low-quality bourgeois
males, with parasitic males being rarer and less likely to persist
when there is little difference in quality between bourgeois
male types (Figure 5). Parasitic males are also less likely to
persist if their quality is low (Equation 26). Thus, we expect
complex effects of the relative quality of good and poor bour-
geois males and reproductive parasites. Counterintuitively,
this means that, in populations with relatively little difference
in quality among bourgeois males, females may be less likely
to visit the poorer quality bourgeois males because parasitic
males are not present. On the other hand, if there are large
differences in quality, poorer quality bourgeois males also
cannot persist, because females will not choose them, despite
the lower risk of parasitism.
In the second model, the distribution of females and ene-
mies is always the same. In the third model, however, the pro-
portion of parasitic males that visit low-quality bourgeois
males is lower than the proportion of females doing so. This
is because parasitic males scramble for fertilization not only
with other parasitic males but also with the bourgeois males.
Indeed, the distribution of all male competitors (or, more
accurately, competitive weights; Sutherland and Parker,
1985) does match that of females. Good and poor bourgeois
males have the same competitive weight. Therefore, for the
distribution of competitive weights to match that of females,
the distribution of parasitic males must shift toward good
bourgeois males. An increase in the search radius, the overall
number of males, or the relative competitive abilities of para-
sitic versus bourgeois males results in the distribution of par-
asitic males approaching that of females (i.e., an increasing
proportion of parasitic males visits areas with high densities of
low-quality bourgeois males). This is because each bourgeois
male makes up an increasingly small proportion of the total
competitive weight. Interestingly, the distribution of females is
not influenced by overall parasitic male density or competitive
ability. Intuitively, one might expect that females would shift
to visiting high-quality males if parasites were rare or poor
competitors. However, because a larger proportion of the par-
asitic males visit high-quality bourgeois males, the relative net
benefit of visiting good or poor males remains unchanged for
females.
At equilibrium, there should always be a positive correlation
between enemy density and female visitation. Such a distribu-
tion of harassing males, particularly on bird and ungulate leks,
has been offered as evidence against the role of harassment in
the mating decisions of females because females appear to pre-
fer riskier males despite higher harassment (Bro-Jørgensen,
2002; Carbone and Taborsky, 1995; Saether et al., 1999). How-
ever, this interpretation ignores the decision of the harassing
males, which are also free to move. Several other recent stud-
ies have suggested a similar reason as that given here for such
a correlation (Alonzo and Warner, 1999, 2000; Goncxalves et al.,
2003; Reynolds and Coˆte´, 1995). Here, we have extended this
reasoning to produce general models of the female-enemy
game and examine the influence of this game on the fre-
quency and behavior of males.
Experimental evidence for the importance of interactions
between mobile enemies and females on the decisions of both
comes largely from colonially breeding fishes in which females
also gain the direct benefit of paternal care, rather than those
on true leks. However, mobile enemies are present on true
leks and have been invoked as an influence on lek structure
(e.g., egg predators on lekking cichlids: McKaye, 1983, 1984;
Nshombo, 1991). Goncxalves et al. (2003) found that sneaker
peacock blennies (Salaria pavo) preferred to approach larger
(presumably higher quality) males in the absence of females
but, when females were presented alongside the less preferred
(usually smaller) males, spent more time with the latter. The
density of enemies (sneakers) at a given nest influences the
spawning decisions of females of a Mediterranean wrasse (Sym-
phodus ocellatus). All else being equal, females appear to prefer
nests without sneakers (Alonzo and Warner, 2000; van den
Berghe et al., 1989) or to spawn with bourgeois nest owners
when satellites and sneakers are present (Taborsky, 1994). De-
creasing the density of sneakers resulted in a higher rate of
female spawning but not visitation. However, there is a positive
correlation between male mating success and sneaker density
(Alonzo and Warner, 2000). Thus, there is evidence from this
species that the observed positive correlation occurs in spite of
female avoidance of sneakers, as predicted by both our model
and theirs (Alonzo and Warner, 2000). Extending this logic,
we suggest that relative enemy density could be a source of
information regarding the relative intrinsic qualities of males
on a lek.
These models show that a female-enemy game can alter
patterns of female mate choice leading to reduced reproduc-
tive skew and the persistence of poor males. The proportion
of poor males in the population even increases with increas-
ing costliness of enemies to females. Thus, enemy avoidance is
a plausible solution to the lek paradox in some cases. Further-
more, the models suggest that it can be favorable for good
males to refuse receptive females under certain conditions.
These insights are counterintuitive from the perspective of
fixed enemy densities, rather than enemies being players in
the game. There are other players that have not been consid-
ered in these models. In our models, bourgeois males do not
make decisions, although their frequency changes as a result
of the female-enemy game. We and others (Alonzo and
Warner, 1999; Goncxalves et al., 2003; Oliveira et al., 2002) have
suggested that one way they may influence the game is by
rejecting some females. Another likely response of bourgeois
males is to alter defense of the territory or provide informa-
tion regarding territory safety (e.g., Warner and Dill, 2000).
Incorporating the decisions of all players in the mate choice
game would provide a more complete understanding of mat-
ing success and mate choice on leks.
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